This paper examines the consequences of the non-GAAP reporting resulting from Regulation G as required by Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the SEC's issuance of Compliance & Disclosure Interpretations (C&DIs) in 2010. The paper finds (i) that both Regulation G and C&DIs are associated with an increase in the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions, (ii) a decline in the probability of meeting or slightly exceeding analysts' forecasts when firms exclude positive non-GAAP exclusions, and (iii) a reduction in the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) during the post-C&DIs period, but an increase in the post-Regulation G period. This study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by providing evidence on whether Regulation G and C&DIs have encouraged informative or opportunistic non-GAAP earnings. Furthermore, this study adds to the regulation literature by highlighting the unintended economic consequences of regulation by regulatory bodies.
Introduction
Over the past two decades, the use of non-GAAP earnings (also known as "pro-forma", "street", or "core" earnings) has increased dramatically (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Kolev et al., 2008) . In 2003, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) raised concerns regarding the potential misuse of non-GAAP earnings and intervened to regulate the reporting of non-GAAP earnings by issuing Regulation G. Subsequently, in 2010, the SEC issued new Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (C&DIs), relaxing the rigorous existing SEC 2003 general guidance (the FAQ) on Regulation G and S-K without changing the current regulation.
1 These new, non-binding, SEC staff interpretations allowed SEC registrants to use extensive discretion in their voluntary disclosure practices, presumably to improve the quality of non-GAAP disclosure following the C&DIs. This paper investigates the accounting information effects of both regulatory changes on the quality of exclusions from non-GAAP reporting. It considers (i) the association between the exclusions and future operating earnings, (ii) whether positive non-GAAP exclusions are associated with firm's meeting or slightly exceeding analysts' forecasts, and (iii) the market response to earnings announcements around each regulatory and interpretive guidance change. Quality of exclusions are defined as those that are more transitory and have less predictive power for future operating earnings, following Doyle et al. (2003) , Gu and Chen (2004) , Frankel et al. (2007) , and Kolev et al. (2008) .
The motivation for this study is two-fold. First, this study exploits two regulatory settings to investigate whether the SEC's interventions achieve their regulatory outcomes. The two regulatory settings are: the SEC's implementation of Regulation G on January 22, 2003, imposing additional disclosure and filing requirements on firms publicly disclosing non-GAAP earnings; and the SEC's issuance of new C&DIs on January 11, 2010, relaxing the restrictive guidance of Regulation G. Empirical findings tend to support the implementation of Regulation G, as it improves the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions and curtails firm's opportunistic behaviour (e.g., Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Kolev et al., 2008; Frankel et al., 2011) . Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the issuance of C&DIs, are, however, limited (the notable exception being Kyung, 2014) .
The second motivation is to add to the debate on the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. Extant research propose competing theories to explain the use of non-GAAP earnings. On one hand, the information hypothesis proposes that excluding transitory items when estimating non-GAAP earnings enables managers to provide enhanced earnings measurement (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Doyle et al., 2003; Frankel and Roychowdhury, 2004; Kolev et al., 2008) . On the other hand, the opportunism hypothesis argues that excluding certain income-decreasing components enables managers to report non-GAAP earnings metrics that exceed GAAP earnings figures (Doyle et al., 2003; McVay, 2006; Black and Christensen, 2009; Brown et al., 2012) . This paper places equal emphasis on these two hypotheses as both motives affect managers' non-GAAP earnings disclosure practice and it is difficult to determine which motivation is more pervasive.
Consistent with Doyle et al. (2003) , Kolev et al. (2008) and Kyung (2014) , non-GAAP earnings exclusions are separated into special items (i.e., typically regarded as transitory or non-recurring) and other exclusions. 2 We find that the quality of other exclusions has improved following Regulation G and C&DIs (i.e., more transitory). The evidence indicates that firms using positive non-GAAP earnings exclusions (i.e., income-increasing exclusions), particularly to increase non-GAAP earnings metrics, are less likely to meet or slightly exceed analysts' forecasts following Regulation G and C&DIs. Moreover, the market response test produces mixed results. Specifically, investors reduce the value of ERCs following the SEC's new issuance of staff interpretations but increase the coefficient of earnings surprise (ERCs) in the post-Regulation G period.
This study makes two contributions to the literature. First, this paper contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature. The research provides empirical evidence on whether Regulation G and the SEC's issuance of C&DIs have discouraged misleading non-GAAP earnings or encouraged informative non-GAAP earnings. Previous research has documented that non-GAAP earnings both help to inform investors in assessing the firms' core operating performance (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Kolev et al., 2008; Kyung, 2014) but can also mislead investors, thus inflating a firm's equity valuation (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003 Bhattacharya et al., , 2004 Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Bowen et al., 2005; Black and Christensen, 2009; Doyle and Soliman, 2009; Brown et al., 2010) . Hence, this research adds to a growing body of literature that investigates the consequences of Regulation G and the SEC's C&DIs by examining the impacts of disclosure regulation and interpretive guidance. Second, this study adds to the argument regarding the disclosure regulation literature by providing the economic consequences of regulation by regulatory bodies, which may curtail the frequency and quality of non-GAAP reporting.
The remainder of this study is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of Regulation G and the C&DIs, reviews previous literature on non-GAAP earnings, and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 provides a description of the sample selection and research design to test the hypotheses. The results are outlined in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
Regulatory setting, literature review and hypotheses

Regulatory setting and literature review
Non-GAAP earnings measurements became increasingly prevalent during the 1990s (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002) . These non-GAAP figures tend to be more value-relevant, on average, than GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Frankel and Roychowdhury, 2004) . The rationale put forward by managers and in the business press is that the exclusions from non-GAAP earnings are regarded as being transitory and nonrecurring, non-cash, or uninformative of the firm's core operating earnings (Doyle et al., 2003; Gu and Chen, 2004) . Numerous studies have found evidence supporting this information perspective (i.e., the information hypothesis) of non-GAAP earnings. For instance, Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that non-GAAP earnings help predict future profitability when a firm's GAAP earnings informativeness is low and that this firm is more likely to report non-GAAP figures. Empirical evidence also suggests that investors consider non-GAAP earnings as a more informative figure (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004 ).
However, it is possible for firms to use non-GAAP earnings disclosures opportunistically. Non-GAAP earnings disclosures are less regulated and therefore self-determined by corporate managers. For example, Doyle et al. (2003) find that non-GAAP earnings exclusions have predictive ability for future operating earnings and abnormal returns, which indicates that these exclusions may be recurring in the subsequent period. Furthermore, managers seem to use non-GAAP earnings financial metrics to meet or exceed analysts' forecasts (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Doyle and Soliman, 2005) .
Additional disclosure requirements under Regulation G led some firms to abandon the reporting of non-GAAP earnings metrics in their press releases. However, the majority (60 percent) of the non-GAAP disclosers did not change their disclosure policy in the postRegulation G (Marques, 2006; Heflin and Hsu, 2008) .
3 Regulation G potentially influences both opportunism and informativeness of non-GAAP earnings reporting -the reconciliation and management-description provisions of the regulations were intended to make opportunism of non-GAAP earnings reporting transparent and costly, thus enhancing quality of the exclusions from non-GAAP earnings. Empirical evidence is consistent with this view. For example, Kolev et al. (2008) find that after SEC intervention the components excluded from non-GAAP earnings figures are of greater quality by reporting that these exclusions are transitory and non-recurring. 4 They also suggest that the negative correlation between excluded recurring items and future earnings is more statistically significant in the postRegulation G period than in the pre-Regulation G period.
Subsequently, on January 11, the SEC issued new interpretive guidance, namely C&DIs. This interpretive guidance replaced earlier guidance from 2003 and 2004 relating to the Form 8-K Frequently Asked Questions.
5 Figure 1 presents a timeline of the regulatory 3 Heflin and Hsu (2008) find that the Regulation G generated (i) a modest decrease in non-GAAP earnings disclosures, (ii) a decrease in the magnitude of the differences between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings (i.e., total exclusions), (iii) a modest decrease in the probability firms report non-GAAP earnings that meet or slightly exceed analysts' expectations, and (iv) a decrease in the relation between returns and earnings forecast errors. They find the regulations declined the frequency and magnitude of non-GAAP earnings because the regulations enhanced managerial emphasis upon GAAP earnings. They also find, before the regulations, managers were using other exclusions to help them meet or exceed the earnings forecast benchmarks and that the regulations have helped reduce this managerial opportunistic behaviour. 4 Kolev et al. (2008) report that the quality of other exclusions has substantially increased after SEC intervention period into non-GAAP earnings disclosures. However, they also find that the quality of special items has declined following SEC intervention, which suggests that managers may have adapted to the new disclosure environment by switching more recurring items into special exclusions. Consistent with this perspective, they further find that a propensity to shift from using other exclusions before SEC intervention period to special items after post-intervention era is related to lower quality of special items in the latter period. Further, their results indicate that the average quality has enhanced and that the firms that stopped releasing non-GAAP financial metrics tended generally to have lower quality before SEC intervention period are generally consistent with Heflin and Hsu (2008) 's findings, though they take a different methodological approach to the issue. 5 Form 8-K is the form on which public companies report, on a current basis, the occurrence of significant corporate events. A reportable event is a transaction or occurrence of major significance that identifies changes. As these are not regulations, it is possible for firms to not act on these C&DIs. On the contrary, these interpretations may function as efficiently as an actual regulation (for instance, compliance is desired if it is likely to reduce the chance of future litigation). Thus, the interpretations may influence SEC registrants' disclosure practices even though they are non-binding.
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of C&DIs is scarce, with the exception of Kyung (2014) who investigates non-GAAP earnings exclusions and their components (i.e., special items and other exclusions). Special items, by definition, are regarded as high quality exclusions for they have little predictive ability for future operating earnings (i.e., nonrecurring), while other exclusions are the exclusions which managers subjectively exclude because they believe the exclusions do not reflect core performance (Doyle et al., 2003) . Kyung (2014) finds a positive and significant coefficient on other exclusions but an insignificant and inconclusive result on special items in the post-C&DIs period. This suggests that the enhancement in the quality of exclusions is driven by the quality of other exclusions following the C&DIs. It also implies that a relaxation of restrictive 2003 SEC interpretive guidance on non-GAAP earnings enhances the quality of exclusions by allowing managers to exercise greater discretion to exclude some items to better communicate firm's core performance in the post-C&DIs period. Kyung (2014) also finds that the frequency of meeting or slightly exceeding earnings benchmarks using positive non-GAAP exclusions is lower in the post-C&DIs period, which supports the need for SEC interventions.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Hypothesis development
Theory suggests that both the opportunism and information hypotheses effect managers' non-GAAP reporting decisions. Empirical findings support both hypotheses.
Consistent with the information hypothesis, non-GAAP earnings have been found to be more informative to investors relative to GAAP financial metrics, when GAAP earnings are more subjective (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Choi et al., 2007) . Non-GAAP financial metrics are also more predictive of future performance, consistent with these earnings numbers providing a better representation of "core" earnings (Brown and Sivakumar, 2003) . Consistent with the opportunism hypothesis, empirical findings suggest that exclusions of transitory losses from non-GAAP earnings are related to future operating performance, suggesting that these exclusions recur in subsequent periods of firm's financial reporting (e.g., McVay, 2006; Kolev et al., 2008; Black and Christensen, 2009 ).
The first and second hypotheses of this study address the quality of exclusions, while the third hypothesis documents the relevance of non-GAAP earnings for market participants. The first hypothesis, similarly to Kolev et al. (2008) , postulates a quality change for total the non-GAAP financial measures contained in the incorporated reports and provides the required reconciliation. The SEC periodically expands the list of items requiring disclosure on Form 8-K and alters the time within which a Form 8-K must be filed (Source: http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm). For example, the new Question 102.03 provides updated guidance which prohibits adjusting a non-GAAP financial performance measurement to eliminate or smooth items identified as non-recurring, infrequent, or unusual when the nature of the charge or gain is such that it is reasonably likely to recur within two years or there was a similar charge or gain within the prior two years. exclusions, measured by the relationship of exclusions and non-GAAP earnings with future earnings:
H1:
The Under the information hypothesis, if analysts anticipate and are able to identify all real non-GAAP exclusions in their expectations, positive non-GAAP exclusions should not be associated with a greater incidence of meeting or exceeding analysts' forecasts. Under the opportunism hypothesis, in contrast, managers construct non-GAAP earnings to mislead analysts, resulting in meeting or slightly exceeding analysts' forecasts (Doyle et al., 2013) . Accordingly, it is hypothesised (in the alternative form) as follows:
H2:
Firms using positive exclusions from non-GAAP earnings to increase non-GAAP earnings financial metrics are less likely to meet or slightly exceed analysts' forecasts following Regulation G / C&DIs.
The third hypothesis postulates that the two regulatory changes examined improved the quality of non-GAAP earnings by improving the exclusion process. If, post-regulation, market participants are able to detect the opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings exclusions to exceed earnings benchmarks, they will discount the earnings surprise when incomeincreasing non-GAAP exclusions are used, leading to earnings announcements containing less surprise on average. Thus, a reduction in market response (ERCs) is expected, conditional upon the extent to which the market is able to incorporate the higher quality information into the expectation-forming process. Analysts' forecasts (i.e., a component of earnings surprise estimation) are a proxy for market expectations. Accordingly, the market response hypothesis is, in the alternative form:
H3:
Earnings Response Coefficients (ERCs) for firms in the post-Regulation G period / post C&DIs period are lower than in the pre-period.
Empirical tests
In order to maximise statistical power and capitalise on the availability of machine readable data, this study uses IBES actual earnings per share (IBES item VALUE) to proxy for the non-GAAP earnings figure issued in press releases by managers. With data from IBES, CRSP, and Compustat, the empirical tests employ the 48 quarters from the first calendar quarter of 2000 through the fourth calendar quarter of 2012. This study excludes firmquarter observations in 2008 due to the U.S. financial crisis. The final sample is 78,634 and 79,160 firm-quarter observations respectively to test for objectives (i) and (ii), while a sample of 13,810 observations is available for testing objective (iii).
To test H1, a cross-sectional pooled regression is used with the sum of earnings in the subsequent four quarters' operating earnings as a dependent variable. To test the association between positive exclusions and analysts' forecasts, a probit regression is estimated with MEF (Meet or Exceed Analysts' Forecasts) as a dependent variable (set equal to one if the current quarter q of earnings surprise is greater than or equal to zero, and zero otherwise). Secondly, the market response to earnings announcements around the SEC events is examined using the 3_day_MAR (Market-Adjusted Return) as a dependent variable.
6 Dummy variables for positive exclusions are also included to examine the effect of firms with versus without using income-increasing exclusions. Following Doyle et al. (2003; 2013) , all independent variables are decile-ranked and take a value between zero and one (i.e., [decile less one]/nine).
The use of IBES actual earnings per share (IBES item VALUE) to proxy for the non-GAAP earnings figures reported by managers in press releases is consistent with prior research (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2003; Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Kolev et al., 2008; Kyung, 2014) . IBES uses the quarterly press release as its source for the actual earnings per share; and Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that over 65 percent of their hand-collected non-GAAP earnings figures in the press releases perfectly match the IBES actual earnings numbers. The dependant variable for H1 is SUM_FutOpEarn, determined as operating earnings per share from (Compustat item OPEPSQ) summed over quarters q+1 through quarter q+4.
10 For H2, the dependent variable is MEF (Meet or Exceed Analysts' Forecasts), which is a dummy variable equal to one if the current quarter q earnings surprise 11 is greater than or equal to zero, and zero otherwise. Finally, for H3, the dependent variable is 3_day_MAR, constructed as the sum of difference between firm's value-weighted return, inclusive of dividends and other distributions, from one day before to one day after the IBES earnings announcement date, less the return on the value-weighted S&P 500 as a market portfolio from CRSP Daily Stock/Security file. Following Doyle et al. (2003; 2013) , all independent variables are decileranked and take values between zero and one (i.e., ).
Control variables, to control for potential correlated omitted variables, are identified based on previous studies (Kolev et al., 2008; Frankel et al., 2011; and Kyung 2014) : Growth, Ln(Size), Loss, Earnings_Volatility, and Book_to_Market_Assets, each of which is anticipated to be correlated with both Non_GAAP_Earnings and Future-Operating_Earnings. 12 The analysis further includes the natural logarithm of Ln(Size) to deal with skewness in the distribution of the dependant variables. To further control for size effects in the analysis (following Kolev et al., 2008 and Frankel et al., 2011) , variables such as SUM_FutOpEarn, GAAP_Earnings, Non_GAAP_Earnings, Total_Exclusions, Special_Items, Other_Exclusions, and Growth are standardised by total assets per share. All continuous variables are further winsorized at the top and bottom two percent to avoid undue influence by outliers.
13
Following Kolev et al. (2008) and Kyung (2014) , OLS regressions are estimated with standard errors adjusted for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the estimates.
In this study, high quality exclusions are considered to be those which have the least predictive power for future operating earnings, as per Kolev et al. (2008) and Kyung (2014) . The average quality of exclusions for a period is estimated by determining the strength with which non-GAAP exclusions map into future earnings. H1 is therefore tested by estimating, separately for each regulatory change, the following cross-sectional pooled regression equation: It is not the direction but the significance of the β 2 and β 4 coefficients that matters. If exclusions are of good quality (i.e., mostly transitory items), then β 2 would be expected to have an insignificant coefficient (i.e., almost zero value). Alternatively, if exclusions are of bad quality, the absolute value of β 2 is expected to be significantly non-zero. Further, if the exclusion is bad quality, but improved with the respective regulatory change, then the absolute values of β 2 and β 4 are expected to be significantly non-zero and in opposite direction to each other -the absolute magnitude of β 4 is less than absolute magnitude of β 2 so that it brings it closer to zero.
For example, in equation (1), if the coefficient on Total_Exclusions (β 2 ) is negative and statistically significant in both pre-event periods, the exclusions include recurring items, which implies that exclusions are of low quality; thus, non-GAAP earnings would include not all permanent earnings (i.e., are less informative). Then if the coefficient on the interaction variable between Total_Exclusions and POST (β 4 ) is positive and significant, the incremental effect between β 2 and β 4 is still negative but closer to zero, which indicates that the quality of exclusions is enhanced after introducing SEC new events. To determine whether Special Items and Other Exclusions have different effects, a disaggregated version of equation 1 is also estimated: 
The second hypothesis, H2, addresses whether -irrespective of the intrinsic properties of the relationship between exclusions and future earnings -the exclusion process is associated with the extent to which realised future earnings relate to expectations, measured by analysts forecasts. This is articulated as the ability of earnings meet-or-beat analyst forecasts. If there is an incentive to meet-or-beat, it is clear that the use of positive exclusions will be more salient for achieving this benchmark, while negative exclusions do not aid in doing so. H2 is tested using a probit regression with meet-or-beat as the dependant variable, and the same set of explanatory variables. The following equations are estimated: In equation (3), if the coefficient on the Positive_Total_Exclusions variable (β 1 ) is positive and statistically significant to the current quarter q of MEF (Meet or Exceed Analysts' Forecasts), this indicates that firms with the use of positive exclusions from non-GAAP earnings tend to meet or exceed more often in the pre-event periods.
H1 and H2 are similar to Kolev et al. (2008) and Kyung (2014) , to verify their results and the sample selection process in this paper. H3 then extends the investigation -beyond consideration of how the non-GAAP announcement information maps into future earnings and analyst accuracy -to the impact that the institutional changes have on price informativeness of earnings, through ERCs. The extent of the change in ERCs will depend on the level of exclusions, i.e., the extent to which profits are adjusted for the announcement. Thus dummy variables are included for of positive exclusions to examine the effect of firms using income-increasing exclusions, in comparison to those without, as follows: 
where variables are as previously defined, with the following additional variables:
3_day_MAR (Market-Adjusted Return): this dependent variable represents the sum of difference between firm's value-weighted return, inclusive of dividends and other distributions, from one day before to one day after the IBES earnings announcement date, less the return on the value-weighted S&P 500 as a market portfolio from CRSP Daily Stock/Security file; and
Surprise: a firm's earnings surprise (Non_GAAP_Earnings less the consensus median earnings forecast [IBES item MEDEST]) divided by firm's market price (CRSP/Compustat item PRCCQ).
In equation (5), the coefficient on the interaction variable (β 4 ) between Surprise and POST is expected to be significant and of opposite sign to the ERC (β 1 -the coefficient on Surprise), which would be consistent with the idea that each regulatory change reduces the amount of surprise in earnings. In other words, this pattern would imply that the regulatory change allows information to be impounded in share price prior to the earnings announcement occurring. 
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics and correlations
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
For the C&DIs sample (49,844 firm-quarter observations), Non_GAAP_Earnings per share has a higher mean (0.308) and median (0.240) than the Regulation G sample. The mean of Total_Exclusions is also higher at 0.127. This is different to Kyung (2014) , who suggests that the SEC's issuance of C&DIs reduced the differences between GAAP_Earnings and Non_GAAP_Earnings per share. Special_Items are similar to the mean value in both SEC events (0.025 and 0.026, respectively) but Other_Exclusions are larger in the C&DIs period (0.093), compared with 0.032 in the Regulation G period.
15 SUM_FutOpEarn are also larger at 0.883 for the C&DI period as compared to 0.861 for the Regulation G period.
Mean (median)
Growth is -0.301 (0.000) for the Regulation G period and -0.281 (0.000) for the C&DIs period. This result is quite different from Kolev et al. (2008) and Kyung (2014) . 16 Finally, Earnings_Volatility is slightly higher in the Regulation G sample rather than in the C&DIs sample. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) indicate that firms with high earnings volatility (e.g., IT technology and pharmaceutical firms with high R&D) are more likely to be associated with the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. Table 2 presents a pairwise correlation matrix with the main dependent and independent variables. Total_Exclusions are negatively correlated with GAAP_Earnings for Regulation G (ρ = -0.900), and C&DIs (ρ = -0.741), which is evidence that the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings appears when firm's operating earnings indicate poor performance. SUM_FutOpEarn are positively correlated with GAAP_Earnings for Regulation G (ρ = 0.976) and C&DIs (ρ = 0.923), and are slightly positively correlated with Non_GAAP_Earnings for Regulation G (ρ = 0.079) and C&DIs (ρ = 0.067), which is inconsistent with prior research (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Frankel and Roychowdhury, 2004) that Non_GAAP_Earnings are more permanent and relevant than GAAP_Earnings in a firm's valuation role.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
Further, Total_Exclusions and SUM_FutOpEarn are negatively correlated for Regulation G (ρ = -0.897) and C&DIs (ρ = -0.716), consistent with results of Kolev et al. (2008) that non-GAAP earnings may eliminate income-decreasing expenses associated with SUM_FutOpEarn. Particularly, Special_Items are negatively correlated with GAAP_Earnings and Non_GAAP_Earnings for both SEC events. MEF is positively correlated with Non_GAAP_Earnings and Total_Exclusions (ρ = 0.204 and ρ = 0.133, respectively), but is slightly negatively correlated with SUM_FutOpEarn (ρ = -0.076) and GAAP_Earnings (ρ = -0.079) for the Regulation G period. This suggests that meeting or exceeding analysts' forecasts is more associated with Non_GAAP_Earnings than GAAP_Earnings. Similar results for MEF correlation with above variables appear in the C&DIs sample. Finally Surprise is slightly positively correlated with 3_day_MAR in both SEC events. Table 3 presents the results for H1, which considers how exclusions map into future earnings. Cross-sectional pooled ordinary least squares regressions are estimated with standard errors adjusted for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the estimates. The coefficient on POST in the C&DIs sample is more positive and significant than that in the Regulation G period, suggesting that SEC staff interpretations allow firms to disclose their non-GAAP earnings more frequently.
Results of H1 INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
17 Total_Exclusions are negatively related with SUM_FutOpEarn for both Regulation G (-1.275) and C&DIs (-1.096 ). This suggests that non-GAAP exclusions are not perfectly transitory items (i.e., recurring items) during the both pre-SEC events.
Further, the interaction variable between Total_Exclusions and POST tests the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings has enhanced the quality of non-GAAP exclusions following the implementation of Regulation G and C&DIs. The coefficient on this interaction is positive and significant in both the Regulation G and C&DIs periods; the effect of this interaction on non-GAAP exclusions is to make the latter less negative (i.e., -1.275 + 0.244 = -1.031 and -1.096 + 0.124 = -0.972, respectively). This indicates that the quality of exclusions from non-GAAP earnings is significantly improved in each post-period (i.e. more transitory items excluded). Thus, this result is consistent with H1, which both posit that the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions has been enhanced after SEC regulatory and interpretive guidance changes.
H1 also considers whether Regulation G and C&DIs affect the quality of exclusion components (i.e., Special_Items and Other_Exclusions). The coefficients on Special_Items are negative (-2.094 and -3.474, respectively) and significant at the one percent level in each pre-period. The interaction between Special_Items and POST is positive (6.013 and 9.293) and significant in later time of both periods. Thus, the sum of Special_Items and this interaction term becomes positive (i.e., -2.094 + 6.013 = 3.919 and -3.474 + 9.293 = 5.819, respectively) in the later time of both periods. This suggests that the quality of Special_Items enhances after SEC regulatory and interpretive guidance changes.
18 Doyle et al. (2003; 2013) argue that Other_Exclusions are considered as the low-quality exclusions because those are significantly predictive for SUM_FutOpEarn, determined by managers' own voluntary discretions, and used opportunistically to mislead investors before the SEC intervention. Consistent with the prior research (e.g., Doyle et al., 2003; Kolev et al., 2008; Kyung, 2014) , the interaction variables between Other_Exclusions and POST are positive (0.167 and 0.062) and significant in both SEC regulatory and interpretive guidance changes. The quality of Other_Exclusions has improved following Regulation G and C&DIs (i.e., more transitory items in the Other_Exclusions component). These results are consistent with H1 as Kolev et al. (2008) find Other_Exclusions are more transitory after Regulation G. Table 4 presents the results for H2. Firms using positive exclusions from non-GAAP earnings to increase non-GAAP earnings financial metrics are less likely to meet or slightly exceed analysts' forecasts following Regulation G and SEC's issuance of C&DIs. A probit regression is used to examine the effect of non-GAAP exclusions on the probability to exceed consensus forecasts. Standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the estimates. If managers opportunistically report non-GAAP earnings to meet or slightly exceed analysts' forecasts, one would expect a positive relation between positive exclusions and the MEF dependent variable (e.g., Doyle et al., 2013) . The main independent dummy variable of Positive_Total_Exclusions is equal to one if IBES actual earnings per share (Non_GAAP_Earnings) exceeds GAAP-Earnings per share, and zero otherwise (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Doyle et al., 2003; Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Doyle et al., 2013; Kyung, 2014) . In this paper, the coefficient on this variable is positive (0.430 and 0.525, respectively) and statistically significant in the preperiod of both SEC events.
Results of H2 INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The interaction variable between Positive_Total_Exclusions and POST is negative (-0.079 and -0.067, respectively) and statistically significant at the one percent level for both SEC events. The net effect of Positive_Total_Exclusions and this interaction variable is still positive (i.e., 0.430 + (-0.079) = 0.351 and 0.525 + (-0.067) = 0.458, respectively) and significant but reduces the positive effect in both post-periods. This result sheds light on H2 that firms using positive non-GAAP earnings exclusions particularly to increase non-GAAP earnings metrics are less likely to meet or slightly exceed analysts' forecasts following the Regulation G and C&DIs. Further, other dummy independent variables, Positive_Special_Items and Positive_Other_Exclusions are positive (0.092 and 0.458, respectively) and significant in the pre-Regulation G period; negative (-0.007) and insignificant on Positive_Special_Items in the pre-C&DIs period. The interaction variable between Positive_Special_Items and POST is statistically significant and negative (-0.091) for the Regulation G period, but is positive (0.092) and significant at the one percent level for the C&DIs period.
19 Positive_Other_Exclusions interacted with POST are both negative (-0.111 and -0.067, respectively) and significant in both SEC periods. Thus, the sum of Positive_Other_Exclusions and this interaction variable becomes less positive (i.e., 0.458 + (-0.111) = 0.347 and 0.537 + (-0.067) = 0.470, respectively) in both post-periods. This is consistent with H2, that Other_Exclusions are less used for exceeding analysts' forecasts post-SEC regulations. Table 5 presents the results for H3. Earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for firms in the post-Regulation G (C&DI) period are lower than in the pre-Regulation G period and in the pre-C&DIs period. The dependent variable, 3_day_MAR (Market-Adjusted Return), is defined as the sum of difference between firm's value-weighted return, inclusive of dividends and other distributions, from one day before to one day after the IBES earnings announcement date, less the return on the value-weighted S&P 500 as a market portfolio from CRSP Daily Stock/Security file. Following Doyle et al. (2003; 2013) , all independent variables are decile-ranked and take a value between zero and one (i.e., [decile less one]/nine). Cross-sectional pooled ordinary least squares regression are estimated with standard errors adjusted for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the estimates. The market response (ERCs) to earnings announcements is estimated around both SEC regulatory and interpretive guidance changes. Dummy variables for positive exclusions are also included to examine the effect of firms with versus without using income-increasing exclusions.
Results of H3 INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
In the Regulation G sample, Positive_Total_Exclusions is also negatively (-0.0003) and significantly related with 3_day_MAR. The coefficient of Surprise (ERCs) is negative (-0.0004) and significant (p = 0.001). However, the interaction variable between Surprise and POST is positive (0.0009) and significant at the one percent level. The sum of the coefficient of these two variables is positive (0.0005), (i.e., -0.0004 + 0.0009) and significant, indicating that Regulation G increases the earnings surprise (ERCs). This result is not consistent with H3. 20 Further, there are similar results from the use of Positive_Special_Items and Positive_Other_Exclusions (i.e., both positive exclusions are negative and significant) in which the interaction variable between Surprise and POST are positive (0.0009) and significant at the one percent level in the SEC regulatory change. This unexpected result may be caused by the different size of firm-quarter observations and time periods used in H3 tests compared with other prior research (e.g., Doyle et al., 2003; Marques, 2006; Yi, 2007; Heflin and Hsu, 2008, Doyle et al., 2013) . The sample for H3 is collected from merging four different files among IBES Detail History and IBES Unadjusted Summary Statistics files, CRSP Daily Stock/Security File, and CRSP/Compustat Merged-Fundamentals Quarterly. Particularly during the merging of these files, there is a considerable drop in observations due to missing or unmatched accounting data, yielding a sample size of only 13,810 in comparison to those for H1 and H2 (78,634 and 79,160 respectively). Thus, robustness tests are also undertaken for the validity of this sample (H3) and other replication part of hypotheses (H1 and H2) with non-zero exclusions subsamples (summarised below, not reported).
In the C&DIs period, Positive_Total_Exclusions is also negatively associated with the dependent variable, 3_day_MAR, and the ERCs (the coefficient on Surprise) is positive (0.0011) and significant (p = 0.000). However, in contrast to the Regulation G period, the interaction variable between Surprise and POST is significantly negative (-0.0013) at the one percent level. 21 The incremental effect of the coefficients on the Surprise and its interaction variables equals -0.0002 [i.e., 0.0011+ (-0.0013)] and significant at the one percent level. This suggests that investors now negatively value the ERCs following the SEC's new issuance of staff interpretations. This result is consistent with H3. However, the effects of Positive_Special_Items and Positive_Other_Exclusions are insignificantly related with the dependent variable, 3_day_MAR in the C&DIs period. 
Robustness tests
As some of the documented findings differ slightly from prior research (e.g., Doyle et al., 2003; Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Kolev et al., 2008; Doyle et al., 2013; Kyung, 2014) , a number of non-zero exclusions subsamples are constructed as robustness tests.
The main difference in the robustness tests is the excision of observations where the non-GAAP earnings generation process involved exclusions of zero magnitude. The hypotheses in the main results above investigate whether regulation has enhanced reporting in general. By excising zero exclusions, the robustness tests focus on the observations where regulation would be most likely to lead to change: if firm behaviour around exclusions is expected to change, then it makes sense to consider only the firms likely to be affected by the regulatory and interpretive guidance changes. Each firm-quarter, observations are selected from the full samples. These robustness tests are not reported, but summarised in Figure 2 .
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
In brief, the robustness tests examined changes to the quality of non-GAAP exclusions, frequency of exceeding analysts' forecasts, and market response (ERCs) in response to SEC regulatory and interpretive guidance changes; most of the large subsamples are consistent with H1 and H3, especially in relation to positive exclusions, while for H2 the evidence is weak at best. Overall, both Regulation G and C&DIs seem to have mitigated the opportunistic use of non-GAAP reporting in compliance with SEC's objective to enhance the quality of the exclusions from non-GAAP earnings.
Conclusions
This paper examines various consequences of the non-GAAP disclosure resulting from SEC regulatory and interpretive guidance changes (i.e., Regulation G and C&DIs). Similarly to Kolev et al. (2008) and Kyung (2014) , the paper finds (i) that both Regulation G and C&DIs are associated with an increase in the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions and, (ii) a decline in the probability of meeting or slightly exceeding analysts' forecasts when firms exclude positive non-GAAP exclusions.
It is hypothesised that the market response, measured as earnings response coefficients (ERCs), will change, but this change will be conditional upon the extent to which the market is able to incorporate the higher quality information into the expectation-forming process. In relation to this, the paper finds a reduction in the ERCs during the post-C&DIs period, but an increase in the post-Regulation G period is found.
A key limitation of this paper is the use of IBES actual earnings figures as a proxy for non-GAAP earnings. This method provides less accurate information about the incidence of disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures, as it has been established there is a significant difference between IBES actual earnings and the earnings figures reported by firms in the press releases (Bhattacharya et al., 2003) .
Another limitation of the study is the use of future operating earnings as a measure for current disclosure relevance. However, this is only a valid approach if financial information users fixate on earnings, with non-GAAP earnings merely being considered as "true earnings" with a measurement error. Fixation means that investors fixate upon earnings and fail to attend separately to its components, whether these are non-GAAP earnings and exclusions, or cash flows and accruals. If one of the components (non-GAAP earnings or cash flow) provides a better forecast of future operating earnings than the other (accruals or exclusions), investors who neglect this distinction become overly optimistic about the future prospects of firms with high accruals or exclusions and overly pessimistic about the future prospect of firms with low accruals or exclusions. As a result, the former become overvalued, and subsequently earn low abnormal returns, while the latter become undervalued and are followed by high abnormal returns. The extension in this paper, using ERCs (which reflect a real market-formed consensus between investors), can examine these phenomena while addressing the fixation issue. This paper has addressed the usefulness of non-GAAP earnings in terms of how such earnings, in the presence of exclusions, map into future earnings. Future research may address the degree to which current disclosures are informative about future cash flows (e.g., Arthur et al., 2010) . Table 1 for additional information. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom of two percent. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed test). (-3.11) Ln(Size) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** (-10.41 ) (-10.04 ) (-20.39 ) (-21.72) Loss -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** (-35.41 ) (-33.03 ) (-48.47 ) (-47.60) Earnings_Volatility 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** (-3.61 ) (-4.12 ) (-3.64 ) (-4.46) Book_to_Market_Assets 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 Table 1 for additional information. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom of two percent. Standard errors are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed test). Note: the quality of exclusions in H1 is explicitly measured by positive or negative values of correlation analyses and linear regression coefficients among variables compared with pre-and post-Regulation G and C&DIs. Positive_Total_Exclusions: a dummy variable equal to one if Total_Exclusions are greater than zero, and zero otherwise; Positive_Special_Items: a dummy variable equal to one if Special_Items are greater than zero, and zero otherwise; Positive_Other_Exclusions: a dummy variable equal to one if Other_Exclusions are greater than zero, and zero otherwise. See Table 1 for additional information. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom of two percent. Standard errors are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed test). 3_day_MAR (Market-Adjusted Return): the sum of difference between firm's value-weighted return, inclusive of dividends and other distributions, from one day before to one day after the IBES earnings announcement date, less the return on the value-weighted market portfolio; Surprise: a firm's earnings surprise divided by firm's market price. See Table 1 and 4 for additional information. Note: this hypothesis is measured by earnings response coefficients (ERCs) as returns on earnings surprise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom of two percent. Standard errors are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed test).
